Abstract
Introduction
In many settings, the security of one organization may depend on the security measures taken by others. For example, many web users enter the same password at multiple sites (12; 23) . For this reason, compromise of a lowsecurity site such as a high school reunion web site may provide valid user names and passwords for sensitive sites such as banks or online merchants. In such situations, it is not immediately clear how a bank should best protect its assets: should it invest more in protecting its own sites from compromise that might reveal its passwords, or donate security services to non-profit organizations that could share users credentials? Perhaps the banking industry would be well served by forming a consortium to provide better authentication and web security to non-profits, who may be measurably free-riding on banking industry consumer education programs already. In order to address such questions, we suggest a relatively simple model for evaluating risks, benefits, incentives, and investments by independent organizations with interdependent operations. The main contributions of this paper are to present a core linear influence network model that is applicable to some sample security situations, and explore ways that the model can be used to understand risk and utility-based decision-making tradeoffs. While there is clearly more work needed to establish a comprehensive theory of security decision-making in interdependent industries, we hope this paper identifies a useful connection between economic modeling techniques and security problems that will be useful in further studies.
The quantitative model used in this paper is a variation of a class of recently proposed "linear influence networks" (7; 8) , further discussed in section 2. In this model the dependence between a security investment at one organization and the resulting security benefit at another is assumed linear. While there are likely to be non-linear relationships in some situations, it seems reasonable to use a linear approximation within certain decision-making ranges. Further, in many situations of interest, it is not clear how to obtain meaningful estimates of numerical parameters for more complex non-linear models; a linear approximation is consistent with the accuracy of numerical input into the model. The model also includes a utility function for each organization, representing the generally non-linear relationship between improved absolute security (measured, perhaps, in the probability of a break-in on a given day) and the total value of all deployed security mechanisms to the firm. The use of a non-linear utility function is critical for modeling rational decision making, and distinguishes our model from simple probabilistic fault tolerance and failure models that aim only to provide probability estimates of breakins or failures. The main technical properties of the linear influence network model we use in this paper are Theorem 4.2, stating that if the interaction matrix is strictly diagonally dominant, the resulting game has a unique Nash Equilibrium, and Theorem 4.3 showing that under the same assumptions, a natural iterative strategy by all agents converges to the (unique) Nash equilibrium from any starting point. We also consider a free-riding index that measures the degree to which one organization can potentially reduce its security investment and reap the benefits from investments of others. This framework is able to provide quantitative evaluations of possible investments, given sufficiently accurate quantitative estimates of the governing parameters. In addition, as we illustrate with sample case studies, it appears possible to derive reasonable qualitative insight from ballpark estimates of relevant input quantities. The model allows us to investigate the interdependent nature of security investments by enabling the relationships to be modeled in a flexible way. The relationships need not be symmetric and can be either beneficial or detrimental to neighboring nodes. The investments themselves are restricted only to non-negative real numbers.
Game theoretic models of interaction "networks" have attempted to explicitly model how agents, connected by a set of links, make decisions based on the positive or negative interactions found between players across these links (see section 2). The interactions represented by links in such a network, commonly known in economic circles as externalities, represent the additional cost or benefit incurred by one player due to other players' actions. Typically, these externalities can lead to "suboptimal" investments on the part of the players. The optimality of a set of investments can be measured in a number of ways but generally, we find that it can be assessed using two concepts: (1) amount of free-riding, which reflects the degree to which one player can invest less than they would in isolation, due to the net benefit accrued from other players, and (2) deviation from social optimum, which is the way players would invest if they were directed by a central planner that sought to maximize the total welfare of all of the players. A common theme found in the security scenarios we investigated is that there are both positive and negative interactions between independent agents. Intuitively, an investment in security by one agent may benefit others because the investment reduces a risk shared by both players. A negative interaction usually results from the fact that given two potential victims, an attacker will likely choose the path of least resistance. In other words, an investment in security by one party will increase the likelihood that the other agents within the network are attacked instead. The model we use in this paper incorporates both positive (beneficial) as well as negative (detrimental) externalities. Specifically, the immediate consequences of an agent's actions are augmented by a linear function of others' actions. The coefficients of this linear function can be either positive or negative, corresponding to net positive and negative influences, respectively. Each player's cost, however, is a function of its action alone. Under these conditions, we consider the single stage, complete information game in which each player effectively announces its strategy and receives some utility as a function of its neighbor-augmented decision.
The current password-based authentication method used widely at banks, financial institutions, retail sites, and many non-commercial sites provides an interesting case study. Given the opportunity, many users will use the same username and password for multiple websites, regardless of the content of the site (12; 23). For example, some users might use the same password at Citibank and www.nytimes.com. In one Japanese survey of 1,091 Internet users, 87.7% confessed that they tried to use the same username-password pair for multiple sites (26) . If the user database at one website is more vulnerable to attack than at a more vigilant website, then the security efforts at more vigilant websites are undermined by user behavior and lax security of other sites. In one sense, the increased investment in security of one website could help other websites whose user base overlaps significantly with the website with increased investment. On the other hand, one website's increase in security investments could simply lead to attackers' shifting to other websites with lower security requirements. We model these interdependencies, grouping sites into high security and low security sites, and show how interdependence causes certain websites to invest more than their fair share, while others may choose to free ride and not invest much at all.
Our second case study is based on customer education efforts aimed to combat phishing and online identity theft (see, e.g., (1)). Many banks are investing a significant portion of their security budget in customer education, in an effort to combat phishing. Whether it is through advertising or direct communication with their valued customers, financial institutions must clearly communicate what customers can expect from the banks to ensure that the email customers receive or the website the customer just visited is legitimate. However, different institutions have different email policies, and sometimes undercut each others' efforts. This may even occur within a single institution. For example, in confidential discussion with a large bank, we found that two different policies are used: customers are informed that no links will ever be included in "service" email from the bank, but customers are not told that marketing email from the marketing division may include links. In such a situation, the information security division's efforts to educate bank customers undercuts the marketing divisions effort to sell bank products, and conversely. We model how the customer education efforts at various institutions (or even departments within a single institution) impact one another based on the consistency of the messaging between different organizations in an example network. We show the resulting overinvestment by a subset of the parties within the network due to a single entity with conflicting customer communication policies and show that the subset includes parties that have consistent messaging with the majority.
The third case study discussed in this paper is based on anti-spam efforts through email routing path verification, such as Sender ID, Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and Domain Keys (20; 25; 14) . Generally speaking, these frameworks allow an organization that sends or routes email to insert information into the email that can be verified by the receiver. The verification method generally relies on extended DNS information, in some cases merely requiring additional DNS records, and in other requiring cryptographic information in email and verification keys in DNS records. At first glance, these mechanisms may appear to appeal only to an organizations altruistic motives: if organization A adopts an email sender verification system, this appears only to benefit an organization B that receives email from A and verifies its sender. However, the true value of these mechanisms is more complex. As outlined in Microsoft's Sender ID Whitepaper (21) , an organization that adopts Sender ID benefits directly by protecting the organization's brand against spammers who forge email from the organization. Another direct benefit is the enhanced delivery of authentic email from the organization, as we discuss in section 6.3. While vendors claim that the cost of deploying these methods is low, because the computational load on servers is relatively low (21) , there are still system administration and maintenance costs that must by balanced against the direct and indirect benefits. In order to evaluate the situations in which an organization may rationally decide to adopt Sender ID or related mechanisms, we consider a model in which we have two types of nodes, businesses and email service providers. Modeling an example network with six nodes, we show how in this case, email service providers have no incentive to invest in an email routing path verification framework. Despite the negative externality still present in this system, we find that overall, the businesses benefit from the relationships and in general invest less than they otherwise do as an isolated node. Results are summarized in section 6.3.
Related Work
The literature which provides the context for this area of research can be divided into the economics of information security and network game theory.
The concept that security policy can be optimized through modeling is a growing area of research. Anderson (6) provides an overview of the body of work that has been created around this discipline. They argue that fundamentally, divergent interests create as much a problem as technical design with regards to information security. One of the foundational concepts that has been richly discussed is that the lack of information security is often considered to be a negative externality much like air pollution (11) . As such, investment in information security causes positive externalities. While this is largely true, we argue in this paper that the externality caused by investment in security can be both positive and negative.
The extent to which these externalities impact the level of investment by each party depends on not only the network, it depends on the nature of the relationships between the parties. Varian (24) examines free riding and welfare for several symmetric, two player models, including a "total effort" structure that is similar to our linear influence formulation. Our work extends some of these ideas by allowing for arbitrary numbers of players with potentially asymmetric relationships. We also introduce a metric for quantifying the extent of free riding, something not addressed in Varian's work.
Another influential model along these lines is by Heal and Kunreuther (19) which notes the interdependent structure of information security and studies the impact of this structure within a game theoretic framework. They characterize the equilibrium of a model in which agents choose to either invest or not invest where an investment in a particular shared resource (the canonical example was airline baggage security) leads to increased security. Our work, in contrast, considers any level of investment in [0, ∞) and allows for situations in which investments in security cause negative externalities. Within the context of information security modeling, our major contribution here is a model that allows asymmetric relationships that can be characterized as either beneficial or detrimental with an arbitrary number of players.
Various network game theoretic models have been studied in the existing literature. Most of these have assumed symmetry in either the underlying network or player utility functions. In particular, we call the reader's attention to Galeotti et al. (16) , a working paper that posits a general model for network games in which the payoff of each player is dependent only on its number of neighbors while these players have incomplete information about the network structure. Our model allows for players to have asymmetric payoffs and neighbor relationships but under an assumption of complete information.
In the working paper, Yolken et al. (8), we provide the theoretical results associated with this linear influence model and delve more deeply into technical details. We also present results which show how monotonic improvements can be made given perturbations of certain model parameters. Ballester et al. (7) similarly considers interdependent games and explore existence and uniqueness conditions relating these to the Katz centrality measure for the underlying network of player-to-player interactions. The fundamentals of our model, although developed independently, are the same in that they too, recognize the connec-tion between the optimality conditions with respect to the Nash Equilibria and a linear complementarity problem. But where they focus on the the implications of their theory for the various cases of strategic substitutes and complements, this paper applies this model specifically to the case of information security and discusses the implications of the assumptions made within this context with some qualitative insight into the information security context. We also show a convergent algorithm that allow agents to arrive at the Nash Equilibrium in a distributed manner. We were originally motivated to study this linear influence model based on some of the interdependent relationships we saw in the security setting. Therefore, we consider the application in this setting not only natural but also quite important.
The Model

Network Model
Consider a network of autonomous players with interdependencies as discussed in the introduction. We represent this network using a weighted directed graph, G = {N , E} of nodes N and edges E. Each node represents an autonomous player (e.g. an enterprise making security investment decisions or websites) while the directed link between two players represents some sort of dependence between those players (e.g. the security of the originating node influences the security of the destination node). The set of nodes has N elements, one for each player, indexed as n i for i = 1 . . . N . The set of links, contains an element e ij if a decision by node i influences node j. For each edge there is an associated weight, ψ ij ∈ R, representing the "strength" of the link or the degree of influence of one player on another. It follows that we can encode the combined connection and weight information into a single matrix, W ∈ R N ×N , as follows:
An example network and the associated W matrix is shown in Fig. 1 above.
Incentive Model
Suppose that each player, i, autonomously chooses a level of investment x i ∈ [0, ∞). In vector form, we write the investment levels of all players as x ∈ R N . Because of interdependencies between the systems, actions by one node can produce either positive or negative influences / externalities on its neighbors, as discussed previously. In particular, assume that if e ij ∈ E, then node j's choice is increased (or decreased) by the product ψ ij x i . For ease of notation, we take W = W T in the remainder of this paper, with the components of this matrix denoted w ij . Note that (Wx) i represents the total effective investment in security by all players in the network into node i. Suppose that each player/agent has an associate utility function that quantifies its relative preferences for certain x outcomes over others. One can think of this utility function as a function that translates the effective investment in security into the total "benefit" experienced by that player.
We assume that these functions take the following, quasilinear form:
for some function V i (·) and c i > 0 for each user. c i x i is the linear cost due to the level of effort or investment made by agent i. V i (·) is a function that represents the benefit agent i receives from the effective investment made by itself and all of its neighbors into security. Since a single dollar of investment does not necessarily translate into an additional dollar in benefit, there is a relationship between the investment and the benefit we represent as a function.
Notation Description W ij weight of player i's influence on j for i = j; otherwise 1 w ij weight of player j's influence on i for i = j; otherwise 1; (= W ji ) x vector of player strategy / investment choices
vector of strategies of all players other than i (Wx) i total "effective investment" experienced by i V i (·) "value" received by i as a function of the previous term
total utility of i (i.e., "value" -"cost") given its own strategy and those of all other players g i (x) player i's utility-maximizing, "best" response to x c i cost experienced by i for each unit of its own investment b i point at which V i (·) = c i γ i "free riding ratio" experienced by i Table 1 . Summary of notation. More details for each term can be found in the appropriate sections of the paper body.
For mathematical tractability, we make the following assumptions: 
The fourth condition suggests that if no effective investment is made, there is no benefit. The fifth condition requires that the costs be low enough so that investment is feasible for each user; the sixth ensures that the optimal investment level for each user is finite. This form also suggests diminishing returns for each additional dollar of investment in security.
Given this model, we now consider the single stage, complete information game in which all players simultaneously announce investment levels and receive utility from the resulting x. As is commonly done in the literature, we restrict our attention to outcomes which are Nash Equilibria (NE) in pure strategies, i.e. "stable" points at which no user has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. More formally, these are x = (x i , x −i ) values for which
Alternatively, one can also define a Nash Equilibrium in terms of a "best-response" function. To this end, let:
. It then follows from the definitions above that a feasible investment vector, x, is a Nash Equilibrium if and only if
i.e., x is a fixed point of g. We denote the Nash Equilibrium investment vector as x * .
Equilibrium Properties
Optimality Conditions
We now examine the properties of equilibria in the given game, beginning with the associated optimality conditions. To this end, let b i represent the (single) positive value at which V i (·) = c i . By the assumptions made previously, b i exists and is strictly positive for each user. b i represents the optimal level of investment made by player i should no network effects / externalities exist.
It then follows from the first order optimality conditions that any equilibrium, x, must satisfy
and, by the concavity assumptions made previously, that these conditions are also sufficient. Equivalently, we can express the optimality conditions in terms of finding vectors x and y such that
Any solution (x * , y * ) encodes both the NE investment levels and the "slacks" on those users who invest nothing.
The conditions thus take the form of the classic, extensively studied linear complementarity problem (LCP) (13)(9). Because, as mentioned previously, these optimality conditions are both necessary and sufficient, it follows that finding a NE for our game is equivalent to solving the associated LCP for x * . By leveraging results from the latter, we can easily derive strong existence, uniqueness, and convergence results for the given game, as discussed in the next section.
Existence and Uniqueness
We begin with the following definition:
Suppose W is strictly diagonally dominant. This has the interpretation, in the specific case of our model, that the investment by all systems other than i of some fixed amount produces less value for i, in absolute value, than individual investment of the same fixed amount. However, an entity's investment in itself may end up being more valuable to another entity than to itself. The value of an investment is reflected in the utility function which can be different between entities. In other words, even if a fixed amount of investment by one entity that doesn't value security very much may lead to a small amount of utility for that company, that investment and subsequent improvement in security may lead to a relatively larger increase in utility for a neighbor that values security.
Based on this diagonally dominant feature, we now have the following uniqueness theorem:
Theorem 4.2 If W is strictly diagonally dominant, then the given game has a unique Nash Equilibrium.
Proof: If W is diagonally dominant, then it is also a Pmatrix (i.e. the principal minors of W are positive). A P-matrix is a matrix in which every real eigenvalue of each principal submatrix is positive. A diagonally dominant matrix with positive diagonal elements and therefore has only positive real eigenvalue (from the Gershgorin circle theorem (18)). Since each submatrix of a diagonally dominant matrix with positive diagonal elements is also diagonally dominant with positive diagonal elements, it must be a Pmatrix. For W that is a P-matrix, the associated LCP has a unique solution for any b (see (13)(9)). This provides an equilibrium for the game.
Convergence
If the system is at x, and this point is a NE, then it follows by definition that no user will want to change its investment level unilaterally. If this point is not a NE, however, then one or more users will be "unhappy". In this case, it seems intuitive that some subset of the latter will update their investment levels to make them optimal given the currently observed x. Ideally, this process continues until a NE is reached, giving an easy to implement, distributed algorithm for converging to such a point (see (15) ).
We can formalize such dynamics as follows. Let time be slotted and indexed as t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. Suppose that "bestresponse" updates are taken asynchronously and each agent responds using its own timescale. Using the notation found in (10), let T i represent the set of times at which user i updates its investment level x i (if necessary). Assume that these sets are infinite for each user implying that updates are done infinitely often. Now consider the following algorithm: 
else 8:
end if 10: end for 11 :
The stopping criterion is ||x − g(x)|| ∞ < for some > 0. The best response function is of the following form: Proof: Let G = |I − W|, a non-negative matrix with all 0 diagonal elements and a maximum row (or column) sum strictly less than 1. By the Gershgorin circle theorem (18) , it follows that necessarily ρ(G) < 1. Thus, from linear algebra theory, we have that there exists some N-component vector, w > 0, such that ||G|| In (5), it is proven that the synchronous algorithm satisfies:
Taking the L w ∞ norm of both sides, we have
for some constant 0 < β < 1. Thus, the synchronous algorithm represents a pseudocontraction with respect to the weighted infinity norm. Using the notation from (10), define the sets
We then have that:
It then follows from the Asynchronous Convergence Theorem in (10) that the corresponding asynchronous algorithm, ABRD, also converges. We thus arrive at the desired result. For a more general result, see (22) .
Free Riding
As discussed previously, our model has the property that investments by one user can produce externalities on its neighbors. When a player benefits from positive externalities produced by a neighbor, the affected player ultimately invests less than it would in isolation. In economics, this is commonly referred to as "free riding". For example, if a company has an finite optimal level of security it would like to have (due to the diminishing returns we described earlier), in isolation the company would invest b i . However, with positive externalities from its neighbors, that same company no longer needs to bear the full burden of investing in security for itself. When a player receives negative externalities from a neighbor, the affected player is forced to invest more than it would in isolation. For example, if a company's security is known to be more lax than a competitor's, attackers may be more likely to attack. As a result, companies faced with such externalities are likely to try to invest more when a competitor increases their investment in security. These relationships are what we hope to capture with what we call the "free riding ratio" which we define more formally below.
Free Riding Ratio
To quantify the effects, we propose the following metric: Definition 5.1 (Free Riding Ratio) Given the game parameters W, V i (·), and c, we then define the free riding ratio for each user, i, as:
Likewise, define the vector γ as (γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ N ).
So, γ i represents the ratio of the externalities produced by i's neighbors over the amount it would invest in isolation. Since b i > 0, |x| < ∞, this ratio is always finite and well defined. Note that γ i can take any value in R. If this quantity is negative, then we have a situation where i is forced to over invest, since the neighbors' contributions is a net negative. If this value is 0, we have no free riding in either the positive or negative sense. If 0 < γ i < 1, then we have some limited free riding, but, even in the most extreme case, user i is investing a positive amount. If γ i ≥ 1, however, we have "complete" free riding and i contributes nothing and depends completely on its neighbors.
Examples and Simulations
Web Authentication
Consider a collection of web-enabled firms. In our model, each firm makes an investment in computer / network security which makes them less susceptible to hostile attacks on their data or network. In this specific example, we have two types of firms: "high risk" firms are those firms for whom security is a must. Due to the nature of their business, they are commonly targeted by attackers. This category includes financial institutions and government agencies, among others. "Low risk" firms are ones for whom security is nice to have. These firms are generally more social in nature (e.g. Classmates.com, Flickr). They are not the ultimate target of an attack but can be used as the inception point for an indirect attack on a "high risk" firm. In general, we can have the number of types be as large as needed.
A connection between two firms implies that they have customers in common who use the same username and password on both sites. If an attacker were able to steal the user database from one firm and try the username and passwords on a neighboring site, they may be able to access confidential data or even worse, drain the funds out of an account. The level of security at one firm, then, impacts the risk faced by a neighboring firm. The reuse of usernames and passwords has been been observed both anecdotally as well as in studies of user behavior. In one such study conducted at Princeton University on a sample of their student population, students indicated that they reuse passwords on multiple websites. In fact, students did not differentiate passwords based on security levels. Students only weakly agreed with the statement "I have different passwords for different security levels of websites. For example, I have a generic password for online newspapers but I have a special password for my online bank account." (17) One of the interesting aspects of this model is that when two firms from the same type are connected to one another, each is negatively impacted by its neighbor's investment in security. Should a neighboring firm of the same type invest in security, it makes that firm less attractive to attackers and the neighboring firms relatively more attractive to attack. When a "high risk" firm is connected to a "low risk" firm, they both benefit from a neighbor's investment in security although this relationship is not symmetric; the benefit the "high risk" firm experiences from a neighboring "low risk" firm's investment is larger than the benefit the "low risk" firm experiences from the same investment made by a neighboring "high risk" firm. This asymmetry results from the fact that an attacker will generally not attack a "high risk" firm in order to get access to one of its "low risk" neighbors.
Assume the utility function for firm i takes the form U i (x) = β i log((Wx) i + 1) − c i x i where β i indicates the relative importance of security for that particular firm and is the same for any two firms of the same type. Naturally, the latter value is higher for a "high risk" firm than a "low risk" one. With this model in mind, we consider the example shown in Figure 2 above. Firms 1 and 2 are "high risk" while the rest are "low risk". All edge weight values are denoted in the Figure caption.
We set c 1 = c 2 = 2 and c i = 1 for all other nodes. We initially set β 1 = β 2 = 22, with β i = 2 for the remaining, "low risk" firms. The optimal level of investment for each firm in isolation was [ 10 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]. The system equilibrium was computed using an ABRD algorithm. As shown in Table 2 above, the "high risk" firms are forced to invest more than their fair share in equilibrium (in this case by more than 10%) while firms 5, 6, 8, and 9 invest nothing. Firm 3 invests only a tiny amount because of the strong positive influences of firm 1's investment. Firms 4 and 7, on the other hand, invest nearly what they would if they were isolated nodes. Translating this to the real world, it is fairly intuitive that the "high risk" companies such as banks end up spending a lot more on security when compared to content focused websites as this equilibrium indicates.
Suppose firm 1 now wants to change the degree to which other smaller companies influence its security. One could drive this down through customer education efforts or even drive this down to zero by creating incompatible require- ments for the username and password with those of the neighbor firms. In particular, fix β 1 = 22 and let w 13 = w 15 = w 16 = w 18 = w 19 = ω for some parameter ω > 0.
Note that W will remain strictly (row) diagonally dominant provided that |ω| < 0.6. We would expect firm 1's investment level to be decreasing in ω since firm 1 can rely more heavily on its neighbors for its security. On the other hand, we would expect that, as ω increases, firms 3, 5, 6, 8, and 9 increase their security investments because of the decreased investment from firm 1. The plots in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show that this intuition is correct. Again, we have just shown the results for firms 1 and 3; the plots for 5, 6, 8, and 9 look similar to the latter and are omitted for brevity.
Clearly, then, there is a tradeoff in lowering the ω value. A natural question that arises is the sensitivity of the Nash Equilibrium to the choices of the model parameters, namely the W matrix. Within the context of this example, we tested how robust these investment decisions would be to changes in W by randomly selecting 25% of the nodes to experience a 25% change in its value. As can be seen in figure 3 , the error bars are are not significant in the range of values seen as W is changed. Therefore, a relatively significant, but random perturbation of the W matrix leaves the investment levels relatively stable.
Lastly, we revisit the options that firm 1 has in order to force some of its neighbors to contribute to investments in security. Noting that firms 5 and 8 currently contribute nothing, firm 1 could share its web authentication resources with firms 5 and 8 to bolster their security. One way of doing this could be by providing federated identity management for these nodes, along the lines of Windows Live ID Federation (4) or Liberty Alliance (3). To implement this within our model, we changed the W matrix to reflect a "collapsed" version of the network. Although we did not fully explore what the correct algorithm would be for collapsing these matrices, we considered one possibility here that allowed us to preserve the diagonal dominant structure of the matrix. We leave a more detailed exploration of what kind of algorithm can be used to collapse this matrix for future research.
In this particular example, firms 1,5 and 8 collapsed into node 1. The strength of the connection between firms 1 and 3 was changed to w 31 = −.2 since we wanted to reflect the fundamental competition between firm 3 and firms 5 and 8. Running the ABRD algorithm on this modified matrix, we derived the Nash equilibrium shown in 2. We find that firm 1's overall investment decreases as it implements the federated identity for firms 5 and 8. If firm 1 implements federated authentication for itself and firms 5 and 8, firms 5 and 8 will have the same effective investment in web authentication as firm 1. Firm 3 must now increase its investments or else it will attract attackers that would have otherwise attacked nodes 5 and 8 in its weaker state. This, in turn, means that firm 1 can invest less in security overall because of firm 3's contribution. The impact of firm 3's increase in investment also extends to firms 4 and 7 which must increase their investments as well. Qualitatively, this suggests that certain firms may have motivation to implement federated identity management with a select group of other web sites.
Phishing and Customer Education
Consider a collection of firms or departments within a single company. Two firms may have customers in common. In order to prevent phishing attempts, the firms invest in educating their customers about their firm's communication policies using direct mail, advertisements and even email. For example, one firm may tell their customers that in email communications, they will never include a link. Another policy might be that any link included must begin with www.companyname.com. Many banks display an image chosen by the user that is embedded in the website of the firm to verify that the user is indeed at the firm's website.
Should two firms that share customers have the same communication policies, any customer education effort done by one firm would clearly benefit the other. On the other hand, if the communication policies contradict one another in any significant way, the customer education effort by one firm would serve to confuse the shared customers with respect to the other firm's policies. The customer education effort at one firm, then, impacts the risk faced by a neighboring firm.
There are three factors that determine the degree of influence one firm has on another:
1. The number of shared customers 2. The degree to which policies agree or disagree 3. The importance or prevalence of those characteristics the policy impacts (e.g. the number of emails that go out with embedded links)
Using the linear influence model described, each node is a company with a customer communication policy and a link exists between two nodes if there are shared customers between the nodes. One unique feature of this situation is that the interaction matrix W is symmetric since consistency or inconsistency of the customer communication policy will impact both parties. In this particular example, each node has identical utility functions, V i (x) = 2 √ x. This can be justified by assuming that each node represents a similar company (e.g. a financial institution of roughly the same size). Suppose the cost is all c i = 0.50 for all users. This implies that b = 0.25e. With a six user example shown in figure 5 , we assume that consistent consumer policies results in a 0.1 influence factor where inconsistent policies result in a -0.2 influence factor. An inconsistent policy serves to confuse the consumer more than the reinforcement a consistent policy would provide.
We obtain the equilibrium for customer education investment levels and free riding ratios as listed in table 3. In this example, the positive externalities experienced by node 3 serve to counteract the negative externality from node 1. Node 3, therefore is able to invest less than it otherwise would, 0.25. Nodes 2 and 4, on the other hand, must compensate for the negative externality they experience from node 1 and must invest more than they otherwise would. In total, the nodes invest 1.59 where they should be investing a total of 1.50 if there were no interaction. If node 1 changes its policy to be consistent with all of the other firms, everyone collectively invests less (0.15 for node 3 and 0.20 for all other nodes) so that the sum total of investment is 1.13, a 25% improvement in the level of investment needed by all of the firms. This model, then, serves to show the degree to which customer education costs could potentially be cut should policies actually be consistent between departments within a particular firm. Anecdotally, we have heard that even within a particular bank, the different product groups might have conflicting policies with regards to their customer communication. Such discrepancies clearly lead to increased cost either due to customer confusion or in the Table 3 . Equilibrium for phishing example. All values are rounded to the nearest hundredth.
increased customer education effort required.
Spam and email path verification
As described in the introduction of this paper, an increasing number of organizations have adopted and deployed anti-spam efforts through email routing path verification frameworks such as Sender ID, Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and Domain Keys (20; 25; 14) . Generally speaking, these frameworks allow an organization that sends or routes email to insert information into the email that can be verified by the receiver. In Sender ID, which evolved from SPF and the CallerID proposal developed by Microsoft, domain owners must identify their sending mail servers by IP Address in new DNS records. Receivers then verify the Purported Responsible Address (PRA) against the information stored in DNS to reject unauthorized messages (2) . In the functionally similar Domain Keys approach developed by Yahoo!, domain owners must include a digital signature in outgoing messages and publish their public key in new DNS records. Receivers then verify the signature against the public key available in DNS to reject unauthorized messages (2) . If the signature is not verified, the email is clearly suspicious. However, the signature can be verified and found to be suspicious due to the originating domain address. This is generally accomplished using some type of reputation system.
At first glance, these mechanisms may appear to appeal only to an organizations altruistic motives: if organization A adopts an email sender verification system, this appears only to benefit an organization B that receives email from A and verifies its sender. However, the true value of these mechanisms is more complex. As outlined in Microsoft's Sender ID Whitepaper (21), Sender ID protects the sending organization's brand against spammers who forge email from the organization. (However, the degree to which this occurs depends on how many receiving organizations deploy Sender ID.) Another direct benefit is the enhanced delivery of authentic email from the organization. Specifically, suppose organization A adopts Domain keys and this gives organization B a reliable way to identify legitimate email from A. Not only does this give B a better way to reject unsolicited email that purports to come from A, but B can be more certain about accepting legitimate email from A. In particular, email from A that might have been accidently blocked by a content-based spam filter can now be accepted by B and delivered to its intended recipient. If email from A to B has business value to A, then this increased delivery of legitimate email from A to B provides useful return on A's investment in Domain Keys (or other such mechanisms). For all of these reasons, if organization A adopts a email sender verification framework, this also benefits other organizations that communicate with A by email. This leads to a very natural instance of the general linear influence network model, with influence between A and B based on the quantity or business value of email exchanged by the two organizations.
While vendors claim that the cost of deploying these methods is low, because the computational load on servers is relatively low (21) , there are still system administration and maintenance costs that must by balanced against the direct and indirect benefits. In particular, the administrative costs can be high in maintaining a comprehensive inventory of all IP addresses that can legitimately send email on that organization's behalf. This can actually be quite complicated given the wide range of partners or third party vendors that may do so on a fairly regular basis (e.g. public relations firms, investor relations, event marketing, help desk). Since there are several competing frameworks at present, an organization can choose to deploy one or more of them, with increasing cost. In addition, a large organization can choose to leverage an email sender verification method for all of its incoming and outgoing email, or only a fraction, with costs varying accordingly.
The level of effort particularly implemented in recognizing "suspicious email" within a reputation system will lead to increasing effectiveness which also shows diminishing returns (e.g. eventually an additional unit of effort in recognizing spam has very little effect). A link between two organizations is the existence of email traffic between those two organizations. The weight associated with a link is determined by two competing interests:
1. Positive influence is derived from the volume of email as well as the business value of the email that traverses a link as long as both parties have implemented the email routing path verification. The outgoing email for a legitimate organization benefits from increased investment in email path verification by any neighbor since legitimate email traffic should pass through spam filters more reliably. Corporate communication will also now be verifiable, ensuring that customers are less likely to become victims of phishing scams. The incoming email should benefit as well since increased investment by others should translate to a larger per- centage of incoming email traffic with verifiable email routing paths. In general, any adoption of path verification should improve the load on the network by dropping spam.
2. Negative influence is derived from the fact that increased investment by one entity in email path verification will likely focus spammers on other organizations. Since spammers are trying to bypass spam filters with the least amount of effort, they are more likely to focus on organizations with smaller investments in spam filters. As such, we can expect larger amounts of spam to be directed at organizations that have less effective email path verification or no such protection at all.
In order to evaluate the situations in which an organization may rationally decide to adopt Sender ID or related mechanisms, we consider a system in which there are two types of nodes: businesses that are potential targets for phishing scams (e.g. banks, payment services, online businesses) and email service providers (e.g. hotmail, yahoo, gmail). As mentioned above, a link indicates email traffic between the two nodes. Each link has varying weights depending on the types of nodes it connects:
1. Business to email service provider: The externality is positive since an email service provider is more effectively able to filter for spam with more businesses participating. However, the impact of a single business on an email service provider is relatively small 2. Email service provider to business: The externality here on one hand is minimal since verifying the email service provider does little to reduce spam since spam tends to originate from many of these service providers. On the other hand, when the email service provider implements email path verification, this allows businesses who can verify their identity with their emails to ensure that their communication will reach their end customer without being falsely identified as spam. This is actually quite valuable to the business and results in a positive externality for the business.
3. Business to business: The externality is positive since the path verification for an email from another business is valuable in identifying spam. There is a slight negative externality resulting from the fact that any increase in investment for one business will result in phishing scams focused on other businesses (e.g. if I know that you have put in place an email path verification system, I am less likely to try to phish your customers since those emails are more likely to be filtered out). The net externality is still positive since the sheer number of businesses makes that effect minimal.
4. Email service provider to email service provider: The externality is a net negative. Whereas when a business' verification gives the author of the email credibility, the verification of an email service provider does little to ensure that the email received is not spam. In addition, similar to the business to business case, the implementation by another email service provider of email path verification or increase in investment will focus phishing scams and spam away from that email service provider potentially making its neighbor more susceptible to phishing attacks and spam. As an example, we generated a small network of 6 nodes as seen in figure 7 . Two nodes, 4 and 5, are email service providers while the others are businesses. The utility function for each node is U i (x) = β i ((W x) i ) αi . We set α i = 0.3 ∀i. We start with β i = 4 for all businesses and β i = 1 for email service providers. This results in the following: In this setting, as seen in table 4, the email service providers have no incentive to invest in providing email routing path verification. They are able to free-ride off of the investments made by the businesses. If the β i for email service providers is gradually increased as seen in figure 6 , the email service providers eventually have incentive to invest in routing path verification (roughly when β 4 = β 5 = 3). What this means is that the email service providers need to value this service (whether it is motivated by penalties imposed or by customer migration away from service providers who don't provide this service) more in order for them to invest in this service.
The value of this model is not to say that these results are representative of actual relationships between businesses and email service providers. Rather, a decision maker with better knowledge of the incentives and quantitative data on the benefits associated with these decisions could use this type of model to create policies that serve the best interest of all involved parties.
Conclusion and future work
The game theoretic models of interaction "networks" is a useful framework by which we can address the interdependent nature of security investment decisions. The tradeoff between the risk associated with information technology versus the cost of implementing security policies is a long standing problem. We offer in this paper one such model that can be applied in a number of different scenarios to help inform better policy decisions.
We have developed a general quantitative model based on "linear influence networks" to model interdependent security investments. The agents in this model interact in a game of perfect information resulting in a unique Nash Equilibrium. We show that an asynchronous, iterative strategy by all agents will converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium from any starting point.
We applied this model in three different settings. In the first, we modeled the password-based web authentication method used in a wide variety of websites. We noted that many users use the same username and password at multiple sites. We showed how in this case, the overlap in users between websites created interdependencies that ultimately resulted in certain types of websites investing more than their fair share. Within this context we tested how robust the equilibrium was relative to random perturbations of the interaction matrix and found that the investment levels were relatively stable. We also collapsed the matrix to represent the introduction of federated identity management by one firm with a select group of other firms. We found that this reduced the level of investment required by the company sponsoring federated identity management for the nodes.
In a second scenario, we modeled the customer outreach efforts that aim to educate them on phishing and identity theft. Clearly inconsistent messaging results in significant over-investment in customer education. With this model, we can see which departments or firms are forced to overinvest as a result of inconsistent messaging.
Last, we applied this model to the email routing path verification setting. Here, we model two types of entities: businesses and email service providers. Based on the email traffic between these entities, various levels of externalities are exerted on the agents in the model. We found that in general, the email service providers were not always inclined to invest in routing path verification. It required making sure that the email service providers valued the routing path verification service (through penalties for lack of installation or added benefits for installation) in order to motivate email service providers to invest.
These examples serve as case studies rather than true models of these scenarios. We hope that these examples can motivate the use of economic modeling and in particular, "network" game theoretic modeling of security problems to highlight incentives and risks associated with organizations that have interdependent operations.
Future work with this model includes design questions based on these models: given what we know, what incentives can we put in place to arrive at a "better" Nash equilibrium? Similarly, what changes can we make to the structure of the network in order improve the resulting equilibrium? We also plan to explore the possibility of relaxing some of the fundamental assumptions such as the diagonal dominance of the linear influence matrix. By doing so, we open the possibility of more generalized investment decisions so that agents can invest not only in themselves but in other entities as well. In doing so, we should be able to address a larger variety of questions including whether or not entities would be well served by subsidizing other entities in their security investments.
